Abstract. Th e essay deals with the formation of the Greimassian thought from its earliest origins in his young years at Kaunas University, i.e. his connections with Wilhelm Sesemann, Lev Karsavin and Russian formalism, to the rise of structuralism in Paris. Th e Paris School approach stems from Sémantique structurale (1967) leading to the 'third semiotic revolution' , as Greimas called it, by the invention of the modalities. Th is made his method close to even analytic philosophy and modal logics. In both, a linguistic turn and use of formal logics took place. Yet Greimas' semiotics grew out of a purely linguistic framework into a broader philosophical approach. Nowadays, considered one of the classics of the semiotic scene, his method still has not lost anything of its analytic acuity and epistemic temptation. Even such new paradigms as existential semiotics grow organically from some Greimas' ideas which have kept their relevance.
unclassifi able fi gures like Umberto Eco and Juri Lotman. However, to recall the lecture entitled "Vers la troisième revolution semiotique" ["Towards a third semiotic revolution"] that Greimas delivered in Finland at the Summer Congress of the Finnish Semiotic Society in July 1983, the 'revolutions' were, according to him: (1) the invention of semantics by Michel Bréal; (2) the invention of structural linguistics by de Saussure; and (3) the invention of modalities at the Paris School around Greimas himself. 1 In this essay I try to look at his contribution both from the inside and the outside. We could distinguish four phases in it, in chronological order: (1) the origins in Kaunas; (2) the beginning -La sémantique structurale (1966) ; (3) the apogee -the generative course and Dictionnaire (1979) ; and (4) post-Greimassian developments. In fact, I found a rather similar periodization of Greimas' career in an essay written by Paul Perron (Perron 2001: 194) . He, however, speaks of three phases: (a) defi ning subject/ object relations by a canonical narrative scheme, i.e. either subject has an object or is conjuncted with it or he does not, i.e. he is disjuncted from it; (b) modal grammars portraying the subject's competence; and (c) semiotics of passions, i.e. how passions modify action (it could be said that this is the supremacy of modalities). Th is equals the third phase in my classifi cation.
However, I take the liberty of writing as an insider in the sense that I became Greimas' pupil in the early 1970s and could follow his legendary seminars in Paris. I was also able to follow his later developments by personal contact and correspondence and in my own research into musical semiotics using his method. Since the 1980s I spent more time in the US, though, received new impulses from Bloomington, and could see his approach also from the outside, through the eyes of diff erent other schools.
In general, when reading the Greimas literature in anthologies, encyclopedias and monographs one can detect two basic types of discourse surrounding him. One is maintained by his faithful disciples trying to preserve the metalanguage intact from any changes and transformations as to terminology. Th ey continue the heritage, but the problem with this may be that other scholars in the global semiotic community do not always understand their vocabulary. On the other hand, the evaluations in encyclopedias and course books on semiotics in English do not really nail his contribution, classifying him in a manner that either covers only its essential aspects or straightforwardly does not comprehend its true nature. So we have to balance between these approaches to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of such extremities. Semiotics -in Finland and elsewhere. Greimas -Lotman -Kristeva -Sebeok -Fontanille -Tarasti. DVD produced by Merja Bauters et al., 2007. Metropolia: Helsinki. 
See the DVD: Signifi cant Moments in the History of

Early infl uences: Sesemann
Th ere is something similar in the early phases of scholars usually considered as adversaries, such as, e.g. Th omas A. Sebeok, namely the oblivion of the early stage of their careers. In the US no one any longer spoke about the Finno-Ugrian background of Sebeok as a Hungarian and distinguished scholar of the Tcheremiss and other Siberian Finno-Ugrian tribes. Nor has anything been said about Greimas' years of study in Kaunas, although it is oft en the early years that are decisive in one's life, off ering a store of ideas to which one later returns. Before Rimtautas Kašponis systematically started to collect documents on Greimas' childhood and youth (Kašponis 2014) , very little was known about it. In this essay I shall not deal with his biography as such, but it is signifi cant what he studied, and under whom, at Kaunas University in the 1930s before World War II. His study book shows (see Tarasti 2015: 379; a document from Kašponis' sources) that he took a course in logics with the famous Lithuanian philosopher Vasily Sesemann, who came from the Parland family in Finland (the most remarkable fi gures in the history of Finnish semiotics were Henry and Oscar Parland; see Parland 1991) . From the essays on culture written as early as in the 1920s by Henry Parland, a kind of "Roland Barthes before Barthes", we know that semiotic ideas had come to his mind via the St. Petersburg linguist Viktor Zhirmunskij who was so close a friend of Sesemann's that the wrote a preface to his Aesthetics.
So Greimas moved in the circles of Sesemann, but also in that of another scholar, Lev Karsavin. Karsavin was a philosopher and cultural historian whom Sesemann had invited to settle at Kaunas University. Karsavin belonged to the Russian intelligentsia of the 1920s (the famous ballet dancer Tamara Karsavina was his sister), but he had learned the Lithuanian language so well that later Greimas wrote that it had been Karsavin who had shown him that Lithuanian could also be a language of science. Th e life of Sesemann has been studied by the German scholar Th orsten Botz-Bornstein (2006) ; the Lithuanian philosopher Leonidas Donskis has edited an English edition of Sesemann's Aesthetics (2007; translated by Mykolar Drunga). As an aside, an English-language version of this major work by Sesemann was a project between me and Greimas for a long time in the 1980s, and we corresponded on this issue which, however, did not become realized then. If we think of Sesemann's possible intellectual impact on Greimas, we can note that he had studied philosophy in St. Petersburg and then at the University of Marburg. In Germany Sesemann discovered the Neo-Kantian School of Marburg and Freiburg; Nicolai Hartmann, who would become a towering fi gure in modern German philosophy, was Sesemann's classmate in St. Petersburg classical gymnasium. Infl uenced by Nikolaj Losskij's intuitivist philosophy, the Neo-Kantians' ideas, Hartmann's ontology and philosophical anthropology, as well as phenomenological philosophy, Sesemann wrote numerous articles in German and Russian on philosophical idealism, classical and modern epistemology, logic and aesthetics (Donskis 2007: xxv) .
As we know, there is a direct line via Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms and Neo-Kantianism to structuralism. Th e three categories of discoursivization: spatiality, temporality and actoriality in later Greimas stem from Kant and his a priori categories of space, time and subject. So the origin may lie here.
Moreover, Sesemann was familiar with Russian formalism although he did not quite accept all of its ideas. Th e most important point I could fi nd there was that meaning was always something ungegenständlich, immaterial; thus very diffi cult to study empirically. In fact, we can fi nd the same argument in Greimas and his notion of isotopy -although isotopies could be said to consist of recurrent classemes -as well as in the semiosphere of the Tartu-Moscow School or, to put it like the American semiotician John Deely: sign is never a thing, it is an object (Deely 2001: 419, 564, et pass.) .
In addition, Botz-Bornstein has discovered that for Sesemann meaning was neither totally subjective, to be studied as a state of human mind, nor completely objective i.e. existing in a text, but living between these, in a form he saw to possess a certain rhythm (note what the late Greimas spoke about tensivity and valence). Sesemann was infl uenced by Russian formalism but his view of form was rather dynamic, almost kinetic. Th e place where he put it between the subjective and the objective comes close to Greimas' concept of le monde naturel which was not natural, but already semiotized by the human mind.
As mentioned above, Zhirmunskij was a close friend of Sesemann's. However, Sesemann also criticizes Russian formalists; his view of structure was that it was inner rhythm which constituted the true aesthetic moment. Th is was close to Losskij's notion of the organic whole or the Neo-Kantian eff orts to dynamize static logical systems. Elsewhere, however, Sesemann emphasized two forms of knowledge, kennen and wissen, of which the former was more important (in French philosophy, Vladimir Jankélévitch made a similar distinction between connaissance and savoir).
Vladimir Propp
Now, we still have to consider the way the ideas of Vladimir Propp reached Greimas since my hypothesis is that there might be a "Finnish link" even here.
Th e name that fi rst comes up is certainly that of Vladimir Propp. Th e innovation introduced in Morphology of Folktale as early as in 1928 was decisive, and in order to understand its fecundity we can only ponder from what kind of network of ideas it emerged. Propp's basic realization when dealing with Russian fairy tales was that the elements of one tale could be transferred onto another without any changes. For instance, Baba Yaga can appear in most diverse fairy tales and plots.
Th e very notion of plot is defi ned as follows: one chooses at random one part of a tale, provides it with the word 'about' , and then the defi nition is complete; for instance, a tale containing a dragon fi ght belongs to the type "a fairy tale about a fi ght with a dragon". Propp found all earlier classifi cations unsuccessful. For Veselovskij, plot consisted of several motifs, a motif develops into a section. Plot is a theme which consists of various situations. For him, the motif is primary, the plot is secondary. Propp, however Lévi-Strauss published his comments on Propp in his essay entitled "L'analyse morphologique des contes russes" in 1960. He praises the translators of Propp's work whose work has done an immense service to the humanities. Lévi-Strauss then comments on Propp and admits that the latter's criticism of earlier scholars (Miller, Wundt, Aarne, Veselovskij) is justifi ed: the problem is that one can always fi nd tales that simultaneously belong to several categories because classifi cation is based upon types of tale or themes which they enact. Th e distinction of theme is arbitrary, though. Aarne's classifi cation provided an inventory of themes which is of big help, but segmentation is purely empirical, although the belonging of a tale to any category is always approximate.
Propp's work was indeed celebrated by the structuralist movement by and large. It was one of the starting points for Greimas' school and he launched the discussion in his Sémantique structurale in 1966. Like Lévi-Strauss, he noticed that Propp's list could be made more economic and as to the actant and the actors fulfi lling the functions, one could distinguish what he called the mythical actant model with six members: subject, object, sender, receiver, helper and opponent.
However, in his book the concept of an actant appears much earlier than his evocation of Propp in the chapter "A la recherché des modèles de transformation" (Greimas 1966: 192) . Also Greimas tried to reduce the number of functions.
When the structuralist vogue had lost its attractiveness, what remained was narratology, which could still consider Propp as its pioneer: almost all canonical analyses of stories start with segmentation. It works even in musical narratology as I have tried to show in my study of Chopin's Ballade G Minor with its modal grammar. Yet as Ugo Volli has said about such use of Propp, various authors since Propp have tried to extend the morphology to other narrative genres, such as myth, legend, popular literature, and modern novel, but in order to do so it is necessary for the analysis to be brought upon a higher level of abstraction (Volli 2000: 111) . It is hard to imagine any other type of systematic narrative study than one stemming from Proppian 'functions' . Still, the above-mentioned Antti Aarne and the Krohn brothers constituted the so-called "Finnish school of folkloristics". I had never heard about it before a trip to Brazil where I bought a study by the Brazilian anthropologist Renato Almeida entitled A Inteligencia do folklore (Almeida 1974) and to my surprise it contained a chapter on Escola fi nlandesa. Still, it might be something of an exaggeration to argue that Propp received the intellectual impetus for his Morphology of Folktale from this Finnish. school. As Vilmos Voigt has put it, Propp rather criticized Aarne's methodology. Likewise, Grigori Levinton from St. Petersburg European University has told me that the Finnish connection was an erroneous hypothesis. Nevertheless, taking into account the whole network of ideas around the young Greimas in Kaunas, Sesemann, Karsavin, Zhirmunskij in the background, etc., and then the somewhat later Greimas of the mid-1960s aft er the publication of the French translation of Propp's Morphology of Folktale by Seuil, it is perhaps not so far-fetched. Why could it be important? Of course because the origin of the whole discipline of narratology stems from these sources.
The beginning of Greimas' structuralism
We may now skip the post-war phases of Greimas' journeyman years via Alexandria and Ankara and fi nally to France. Naturally, we should not forget the friendship between Roland Barthes and Greimas that was established during those years abroad. In his history of structuralism, François Dosse (1991) mentions that 1966 that saw the publication of Greimas' Sémantique structurale in the year of "les succes structuralistes" stemmed from the Greimas' seminar at the Institut Poincaré in 1963-1964. Dosse says: "L'insistance que met Greimas à defendre une sémiotique générale embrassant tous les systèmes de signifi cation à l'ouverture du travail linguistique sur tout autres champs" (Dosse 1991: 262) . So Barthes's Elements de sémiologie that was published in 1968 was clearly written from the Greimassian perspective of general semiotics. Th en, once Greimas had received his position at the EPHE in 1965 with the help of Lévi-Strauss, structuralism had a steady foothold in French academic life.
What was involved was in fact a kind of 'linguistic turn' on the French soil. Yet Dosse's characterization is correct and more justifi ed than those in later encyclopedias of semiotics which all emphasize the linguistic, text-based aspect of Greimassian semiotics, although ever since the beginning its goal obviously had been more "universal" and transdisciplinary. However, the scientifi c ideal of structuralism, i.e. extreme formalism and formalization, was apparent in Sémantique structural, so that the fi nal result of any analysis was a quasi-algebraic, achronic structure. Dosse (1991: 266) ironizes thus: someone had ready a Greimassian analysis of marriage, which ended aft er one thousand pages concluding that marriage is a binary structure. Moreover, Dosse (1991: 274) crystallizes his interpretation of the 1960s, stating that in spite of their diff erences Lévi-Strauss, Greimas and Lacan constituted the trio of the most scientifi c structuralism: "Ce sont les trios fl eurons de la pensée formelle à son zenith". In a conversation Greimas once told me that his method was so rigorous that he could sign any study of his pupils, the method would automatically guarantee the results. Back then, I did not have the courage to oppose, although I thought that then there would be no change or progress in science. "Das Wahre war schon längst gefunden, [hat edle Geisterschaft verbunden;] das alte Wahre fass es an", as Goethe (1840: 268) put it! However, when arriving at Greimas' seminar in Paris as a young passionate Lévi-Straussian structuralist, I soon noticed that I did not understand almost anything happening in the lively discussions among the mostly Italian, Latin American and French pupils of Greimas. Th e reception was of this kind: Greimas introduced me as "a compatriote of George Henrik von Wright", the philosopher who was successor of Wittgenstein in Cambridge and had developed the deontic logic that Greimas admired. Th at happened in the mid-1970s, when I also twice interviewed Roland Barthes, who would have liked to accept me to his seminar; however, when he heard I was already at Greimas' , he lost interest.
Anyway, I quickly realized that fi rst I had to study Sémantique structurale and the best way to do this for a foreigner was to translate it into his own language, in my case Finnish. I started the translation in Paris but it appeared in Finland only much later, in 1982, aft er several revisions (the Finnish language does not have the GrecoRoman-based terminology and so much of the new vocabulary of semiotics just had to be invented).
Still, the year of the original publication of Greimas' work was the year of the 'structural'-Dubois told Greimas, that if he added the term 'structural' to semantics, a thousand more copies of the book would be sold (Dosse 1991: 385) . It was the time of Lévi-Strauss's Structural Anthropology and Rolan Barthes' L'homme structural. What, then, was the innovative aspect of this important book?
For the fi rst, one could see that it was a time not far from the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, or Karl Jaspers -the philosophy is looming in its background. Th e fi rst defi nition of meaning is just one of perception: one has to perceive two diff erent terms simultaneously. In the beginning the fi eld of empirical sign studies is mentioned, as the classifi cation of signs by their signifi ers (visual, auditive, tactile etc.), but it is quickly abandoned in favour of semantics. Th e fi rst method Greimas proposes is semeanalysis, and here, of course, we come close to linguistics and binary oppositions. Also a whiff of information theory, cybernetics and computer studies counting on 0 or 1 is present. Th e analysis of the lexeme 'head' is the model example of such an extremely taxonomic analysis. Th e level of semiology is defi ned.
From the semiotic square and isotopies to narratology
Nevertheless, Greimas does not actually introduce his famous semiotic square yet, although its elements are already clearly present; as everybody knows, the square as such was an old logicians' model which Greimas only brought into the semiotic discussion. Its purpose has been to provide a reading model for any empirical fi eld or phenomenon whose structure and organization are unknown, chaotic, disordered. By using the square, a certain order appears. Th e origin is purely linguistic, but in its general meaning and use the model is a hypothesis of a cognitive deep structure in the brain. One can presume that phenomena follow its law and if we know what S1 and, say, non-S2 are, we may try to infer what the missing parts are. Moreover, in case of temporal semantic universes and texts, the square creates a virtuality for expecting what will happen next in the "becoming" of a text. Let us say, if a composer fi rst gives the listener S2 and non-S1, then when will he give S1 and non-S2? (Th is was the case with Chopin's Polonaise-fantasie as I have tried to show). Th is has a narrative arch; the tension is created due to the postulated structure. Some even have a mystic view on the square regarding the signifi cation emanating from it organically. However, if seen more modestly, it is an important working method and research tool, to be used on any level of text.
Th e fi rst really new concept launched there was the one of isotopy -in English it should perhaps be called 'isotopicity' , i.e. the quality of having isotopes. Yet this deep level of meaning inherent in any text, based empirically on contextual semes and their recurrence, but cognitively, as a mental category, making even the most fragmentary text coherent, is already characteristic of the expansion of the purely linguistic domain to a more philosophical one. How can one for instance prove the existence of isotopy to someone who does not perceive its presence or understand it? Th ere is no way to do that. For instance, in performing arts one may notice that a certain musical, theatrical, fi lmic, gestural (in dance) interpretation etc. is wrong, but so wrong that it cannot be corrected by just changing some signifi ers ("Play louder here, faster here, more slowly here. ") No, it is wrong because the performer did not catch the isotopy.
It must be admitted that from the moment of launching isotopies, Greimassian semiotics became something more, and broader, than pure 'lexicography' as Th omas Sebeok portrayed it or 'narrative discourse grammatics' . Of course, Greimas essentially remained faithful to his linguistic turn; for instance, he said: "Th ere are no truths, there are only statements about the truth". Moreover, the fact that isotopies appeared and became manifest when they changed, as in cases of bi-isotopies or complex isotopies, added an exciting aura to the notion. For example, Oscar Wilde writes a play Th e Importance of Being Earnest (cf. Ernest = a person, earnest = honest). As Greimas put it, any witty talk is based on playing with complex isotopies. Later, in his study on Maupassant he shows how an isotopy makes an otherwise fragmentary text coherent thanks to the spatial isotopy of Paris.
Isotopy is certainly one of Greimas' great contributions to semiotic vocabulary; in fact, it is close to Lotman's 'semiosphere' which has also been claimed to lie in the origin of any meaning and defi ne it as a continuum of signs. Here, extremities meet: let us remember late Peirce and his principle of synechism, of a universe where 'tout se tient' as Greimas would have put it! Isotopy is something to be preserved in any 21st-century semiotics, irrespective of its epistemological ground.
Yet the riches of Sémantique structurale do not end here. Th e Proppian heritage is present in the actant model. Th e Greimassian version of Proppianism was just in the abridgement of actants into six major actantial roles: sender, receiver, subject, object, helper and opponent. Th is remained perhaps the most popular of Greimas' innovations, much applied in diff erent empirical domains. Th is was prophetically foreseen by Greimas himself, when he made several diff erent "thematic investments": a philosopher of the classical age, a Marxist, an economist, a psychoanalyst. Subsequently he ponders the transformations of Propp's functions and moves increasingly closer to extremely formalized reductions.
A little later came the canonical narrative scheme above which Ugo Volli (2000: 120-123) formulated as follows: S  O Subject is conjuncted with Object, or S  O Subject is disjuncted from Object 2 . Th en actions can be portrayed as: S1 -(S2  O i.e. Subject S1 gives a gift of O to subject S2 i.e makes him conjuncted; or makes so that S2 abandons it, is deprived of it S1 -(S2  O). And this means that a story starts when S1 -(S2 -(S3  O): this is the same as make one do something (faire faire) or S1 -(S2 -(S3  O). Th ese schemes fi t all narratives. Now it might be asked how to situate Greimas in the context of analytic philosophy. According to Nathan Houser, the latter has three requirements: (1) the linguistic turnpresent in Greimas; (2) the use of formal logic -present in Greimas (particularly later in his theories of modalities); (3) the correct philosophical style -this is diffi cult to say and depends on how you defi ne it.
At this point, one may already enquire what the purpose of this type of semiotic analysis is. Is this method an extreme reductionism whereby concrete phenomena are reduced into abstract schemes? For the fi rst, why should we translate everything from its original language into a very complicated metalanguage? Th e answer is that in such a reduction new logical possibilities and worlds are revealed in the studied phenomena, dimensions which would otherwise remain hidden. On the other hand, such a metalanguage can serve as an international language of scholars, revealing hitherto concealed new connections between phenomena in the intercultural and transdisciplinary fi eld. Results in one fi eld can benefi t others when the shift from one to the other is made possible by a common metalanguage. For instance, results in the narrative study of literature or cinema can be used in musicology, media, education or sociological or cultural studies. Th is is certainly not far from the idea of unifi ed science entertained by the logical empirists in the 1920s.
At the end of Sémantique structurale an example of the method is given in a study of George Bernanos' novel Journal d'un cure à la campagne [Diary of a Country Priest]. If one has seen Robert Bresson's fi lm based on the novel, one will understand its existentialist nature even better. Th e idea of the narrative focuses around its main protagonist, the young priest in his fi rst parish with an idealist Jesus Christ project who would convert all his villagers into true Christianity. Yet he fails because he does not understand which kind of sign he is for the people around him. Taking into account the existentialist atmosphere of the whole, one is simultaneously fascinated and astonished by the rigorous taxonomic approach of its structural semantics, which approaches its existential message with a cold-blooded method and glance. Th ere is an interesting contradiction involved here.
Apogee: Dictionary and the generative course
Sometime in the mid-1970s Greimas developed the idea of putting all the notions he had hitherto elaborated into what he called a 'generative course' . Generative models had become fashionable due to Noam Chomsky, and tree diagrams were being applied to all sign systems, even to music as by Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1985 or by the conductor Leonard Bernstein in his lecture series Unanswered Question from 1973. Th e grammar behind any sign manifestation or text was supposed to have a deep structure and surface, and the depth was schematized like in Chomsky's example phrase: "John beats his sister". So the originally linear syntactic or syntagmatic chain of signs was shown to be rather a hierachic construction in which signs in the chain were not of equal value. Of course, the idea of deep structure was launched already by other structuralists, but it suited Greimas well. Since the beginning there had been the idea of manifest and immanent levels therein. Syntactic and semantic columns were parallel phenomena in the model and it was possible to follow how the text was either produced from the deep level isotopies via discoursivization to the surface, or the surface gradually reduced to dense abridged deep level structures such as for instance the semiotic square. Th ese two courses -the top-down and the bottom-up one -ran parallel to the idea that a text could be produced from some essential principles or else these principles were gradually revealed and inferred when starting from the text's smallest elements, by a kind of ars combinatoria. No one questions the process itself and its logical, almost 'organic' coherence. It was not far from the old Goethean idea of an Urpfl anz from which all later plants would originate, or, to give an analogy from music, the theory by Heinrich Schenker of Ursatz to which where any tonal music piece ended. Nor is it far from Heideggerian metaphysics and ontology.
Yet a semiotician keener on realism would think that the generation of one level from another is perhaps not a phenomenon of logical organic growth, but contains irrational leaps, gaps and confl icts. Th is, however, remained beyond the structuralist tradition of semiotics to which Greimas remained faithful. Th inking of the situation epistemologically, one may ponder whether the idea to put all Greimas' hitherto invented notions into the straightjacket of parcours génératif was a good one or not.
Th e application of such generation was met with diffi culties from the very beginning. One major question was when to start to apply it and when to stop. If the problem being investigated was restricted to a certain level of generation, why should one launch the whole heavy apparatus to reveal its organization? Greimas never spoke about the 'bon usage' of his model; in a word, there had to be a higher-level logic somewhere, prompting when to start and when to stop using the generative model. Th e case of the Finnish theatre scholar Kari Salosaari (1989) is a good example. He created an extremely complex generative model for actor's work in drama and even used it in his experimental theatre productions of certain classics from Shakespeare to Sophokles. Yet at the defence of his doctoral thesis he could not answer the question of which kind of sign is an actor who is playing someone sleeping and then really falls asleep on stage.
Gianfranco Marrone (2014: 51) has recently pondered and well clarifi ed these problems in his study Th e Invention of the Text. He argues:
Th e text appears, therefore, as the tip of the iceberg of the generative trajectory of meaning, the place where this trajectory acquires an expression-substance and thus makes an empirical concreteness, becomes communicable, cognizable and reachable. [...] Th e generative trajectory of meaning is in turn the simulation of the diff erent levels of relevance in which meaning textualizes itself. [...] Any human and social signifi cation can be described by the semiotician at diff erent levels, more or less abstract, more or less simple [...] Th is, however, was said much later.
Modalities
Nevertheless, side by side with parcours génératif also totally new elements were elaborated by the Paris School, ideas that in the course of time would survive the scientifi c fashions better. One such innovation was introduced by Greimas in his famous lecture "Vers la troisième revolution sémiotique" given at Jyväskylä in 1983 -it was the discovery of modalities. Th is notion changed the whole paradigm radically: instead of studying the structure of an object or a text, the attention was shift ed to the subject and his/her activities and attitudes towards the object. In fact, this almost meant abandoning the old structuralist idea of focusing on a text.
When consulting a French dictionary, we can fi nd the defi nition of 'modalities' . If one is a music scholar, one should be careful not to confuse them with modal scales and church tones. Here, modalities mean only the ways whereby the speaker animates his/her speech according to his/her wishes, hopes, certainties, uncertainties, abilities, etc. So modalities provide an essential source of meanings present in any communication. Th inking of Saussure's famous diagram of a dialogue, Mr. A saying something to Mr. B, the space between them is not empty or a vacuum: already before any act of communication, before anything has been uttered, it is fi lled by modalities. Modalization is the process whereby modalities penetrate the discourse. Yet there is the 'enunciated enunciation' , i.e. the process has already been put in the discourse and its structure as in "J' espère qu'il vienne" ["I hope he will come. "]. Not all languages have this prominent quality, say, the Finno-Ugrian languages have only a few such cases of the subjunctive, as the Finnish 'hän tullee, hän mennee' , which conveys uncertainty. Th erefore it can be asked whether modalities are a universal feature of all semiosis. Th e anthropologist Elli-Kaija Köngas-Maranda once told me that she wondered whether her indigenous people in Polynesia would have an idea of "dürfen, wollen, können" (for some reason she used German words) and what these meant. Once lecturing at a Greimas seminar in Paris I said that I did not know if, for instance, there were modalities in the Chinese language. Aft erwards, two Chinese students approached me, feeling upset that I had been underestimating Chinese culture in this respect as if it were lacking something essential for communication. Th at had by no means been my intention. To the contrary, I do believe that modalities, the fundamental ones of 'being' , 'doing' 'appearing' and maybe 'becoming' are universal, as well as other modalities of 'know' , 'must' , 'can' and 'will' . I use the modalities in this way in English for the sake of brevity, instead of saying 'to be obliged to' or 'to be able to' . Of course we can also argue that there might be more modalities than those hitherto listed by the Greimas' school.
One problem arising in a concrete text or discourse analysis is of course that modalities appear via what Greimas calls 'aspectualization' , i.e. some modality is present suffi ciently/insuffi ciently or excessively/inexcessively. Th is gave me the idea, so to say, to 'digitalize' modalities which as such are of a continuous nature in my music analyses. So I could give for instance fi ve values according to the extent to which a modality was functioning in the text: 'very much' , 'much' , 'neutrally' , 'insuffi ciently' , 'inexcessively' , or '++' , '+' , '0' , '-' , '--' . Th e next question was: on which competence can a reader make this interpretation, does it have an objective basis or is it totally subjective and arbitrary? Earlier I tended to think that the modal values were based upon the previous articulations of space, time and actors on the discoursive level. So the devices of disengagement and engagement were important. Sometimes these terms created more confusion, for instance when one colleague once said aft er my speech: "I agree that political engagement is important even in semiotics. However, nowadays I am inclined to think that modalities are primal, and then they become more concrete and articulated signs. " Ultimately one can write a modal grammar of a whole text using the Greimassian symbolic notation. For instance, quoting the modal grammar on Chopin's Ballade G Minor (see Fig. 6.6 in Tarasti 1979: 179) .
Such an enterprise is very Greimassian and stucturalist in its endeavour to crystallize the result of the analysis into simple logical schemes. Yet, the pragmatic diffi culty here lies in the fact that in the empirical fi eld of music those who are supposed to read such studies and benefi t from them in their interpretations most oft en are not trained in formal logics and hence are unable to understand what is involved. So in this case the results should be expressed via a notation like the standard musical score, i.e. notes which the majority understands. Th is has happened in the so-called Schenker method of music analysis.
As another illustration the work of the Finnish theatre scholar Kari Salosaari could be quoted. In 1989 Salosaari published a systematic study about the actor's work which was completely based on Greimas' generative course. His empirical object was a 10-minutes-long video section from the stage performance of Carlo Goldoni's play Il baruff o in Chioggia, fi lmed at the drama studio of an avant-garde Finnish theatre in Tampere It appears that in the scheme Salosaari left the abridged symbols of modalities to follow French and not Finnish, which probably made his study less accessible. Unfortunately, Salosaari's book has not yet been translated into English or French although it is certainly one of the most Greimassian works ever completed.
Another empirical application of Greimas' idea of generation appears in an essay on gastronomy (Tarasti 2015) . Just like in my studies on musical narrativity, here only certain elements are chosen from the original generative trajectory, namely those which seemed to be relevant for the object. So facts are not forced into theoretical schemes but their selection depends on the phenomenon itself, and its isotopies: the application of Greimas tries to be fl exible, 'idoneist' as the Swiss mathematician Gonseth has said (Fig. 1) . 
Epistemologial refl ections
Th e generative trajectory was also visited by Paul Ricoeur in his famous speech at the Colloque de Cerisy in 1983. His talk was published in the booklet series Bulletin of the Paris School and thereaft er appeared in Temps et récit II. La confi guration dans le récit de fi ction (Ricoeur 1984: 49-51) . His major point was that in his opinion Greimas had tried to build achronic principles of narrativity which existed before the story was told, i.e. before anything was manifested. Th erefore, regarding the Proppian approach, he chose a way to enrich its paradigmatic aspect, i.e. the actants instead of functions whose list had been much longer (31) than that of the actants (6) to start with. What disturbed Ricoeur was just stepping outside the temporal aspect of any narration, yet the major epistemological problem for him was whether the surface grammar was richer than the fundamental grammar. If the process is supposed to be generative, everything should be included in the axioms and no additional elements smuggled in during the trajectory. Th is gradual enriching of the model proceeds perhaps from our competence and from our empirical familiarity with all kinds of stories. Ricoeur crystallized his point as follows: Greimas' analysis is teleologically guided by the anticipation of the fi nal stage, that means, narration as a process of creating values. We might add here that Greimas is revealed to be rather Hegelian claiming that 'the absolute' only appeared at the end of the world process and development of the spirit.
What then are those "inserted" or smuggled elements in Greimas' system? Ricoeur mentions three: (1) the aspectual structure, i.e. inchoativity, durativity and terminativity which are not well defi ned in relation to fundamental structures; (2) the strongly axiological nature of contents to be invested in the semiotique square (he certainly means the articulation of life/death and nature/culture). Ricoeur rather considers them to contain a euphoric or dysphoric character; (3) the role of destinator; to put it: communication which is the dynamic aspect of signifi cation and which Greimas elegantly calls "operational syntagmatisation". Ricoeur's analysis remains one of the sharpest philosophical comments on Greimas. From an "existential" point of view that the generative trajectory looks a little like the Hegelian palace criticized by Kierkegaard; it is fi ne but the only default element is that the subject does not live there but in a dog hut by its side. Of course those who see Greimas as an incurable nominalist whose slogan was "No salvation outside the discourse" defend the generative construction as a machine of textualization. Rather analogous was the case of Juri Lotman, who considered culture as consisting of texts, but supposed there loomed somewhere inside any culture a procedure or a device or a mechanism which was producing the texts, textualizing the world; or, as Jorge Borges has said, world was a book into which all events we were written.
Th e problem with all these text-based semiotic systems lies, as Ricoeur has already put it, in the text's temporal nature, it having a beginning and an end. So what to think of such texts as architecture, painting, sculpture etc. without time? By talking about text or discourse as well, we secretly introduce strong hypotheses about the nature of these semiotic objects. Th is was in fact already noticed by Th omas Winner and Irene Portis Winner.
But is the text everything in Greimas? Even Marrone who wants to underline the role of text, fi nally admits:
It is therefore necessary to suppose the existence of some kind of element -cultural, historical, scientifi c, social -that is a constructing subject, either individual or collective, taking charge of placing the relationship, of making it relevant and valid within the socio-cultural universe. (Marrone 2014: 56-57) Th e radical innovation occurred in the 1970s -let me once again emphasize the discovery of modalities, because it changed the entire research strategy which was no longer the study of a fi xed object, i.e. a text, nor the study of the mind of a subject as it is in cognitive studies, but lied in the relations of the subject to the object, i.e. the modalization.
In fact, one may say that this had been Greimas' original plan since the beginning. In a recent essay Eric Landowski has spoken about the existential dimension in Greimas, manifested as early as in Sémantique structurale. Landowski correctly states:
Th e Greimassian thought was fi rst and foremost motivated to explore meaning in general. Greimas was not only interested in the signifi cation of texts but in the 'signifi cation of human activities' in the signifi cation of history or simply as he oft en put it in 'the signifi cation of the living experience' . [...] His starting point is the situation of man [...] . But at the same time he showed greatest possible vigilance against the risk of slinking into impressionistic or psychologizing discourse, or of contenting oneself with a speculative kind of inquiry. (Landowski 2013: 11-12) Yet, the problem of experienced meaning soon turned into the problematics of manifested meaning. For Landowski, Greimas thought that the only relevant issue was to understand "in which conditions and by which process our existence in the world makes sense" (Landowski 2013: 12) . So the existential turn was reduced back to the linguistic turn in the sense that the meaning was supposed to appear best in an uttered text. Yet taking into account the existential or experiential dimension did not exclude or ignore earlier results of the studies of textuality carried out during the last decades. Th e semantic world was only seen as identical with the living world, inside which we are defi nitely closed. Th us Landowski (2013: 15) has to repeat the slogan Hors du texte point de salut. Th is meant that the regime outside the text -'regime' being Landowski's favourite term in his social semiotics -was a prohibited zone. Subsequently Landowski develops his own new research line where he distinguishes the subject's existential styles, such as programming and manipulating.
Post-Greimassian era
However, now we have already glided into the post-Greimassian era. So what happened to his school and system aft er Greimas? Some pupils of Greimas had already in his lifetime been developing in diff erent directions, fertilizing the authentic doctrine with all kinds of innovations. Among them is of course Jacques Fontanille, one of the most open-minded scholars of the school who made remarkable fi ndings in the study of space, light, and corporeal semiotics, the latter in his monograph Séma et soma (2004) where he launched the philosophical distinction of Moi and Soi into semiotics. Some others have continued strictly on what they thought was the primal and original Greimas, like Anne Henault, Claude Zilberberg etc.; some discovered new fi elds of application like Ivan Darrault-Harris in psychiatry. Th e strong Italian School continued educating semioticians in a strict Greimassian doctrine, but would pay much attention to the contemporary economic world, media, etc.: scholars like Paolo Fabbri, Guido Ferrari, Ugo Volli, Gianfranco Marrone, Omar Calabrese, Isabella Pezzini have made serious work along these lines. Huge quantities of studies have appeared, yet, essentially, Greimas has been considered a scholar who had found the truth and put it in his writings in an epigrammatic form, like the inscriptions on the ancient stones of Antiquity.
Already early on, the Dictionary contained trends to elaborate his schemes further with a more dynamic outlook. Th e semiotic square was temporalized, words like 'becoming' (devenir) appeared among the fundamental modalities. Th e theory itself was already in motion. Yet, as we know no one can enter the Greimassian universe by reading the Dictionary fi rst. In order to understand it, one should have read all previous literature and, if possible, have attended those endless discussions in Paris seminars and cafeterias. Outside the European context the theory has fl ourished alike in South America as well as in Iran which has recently shown its strength in semiotics by analysing the old and contemporary Persian culture with Greimassian notions. Th is has mostly happened around Reza Hamid Shairi in Tarbiat Modares University in Teheran. However, we are still waiting for the encounter of the Iranian philosophical tradition and a "modern" or "postmodern" semiotic approach.
The existential turn
Nevertheless, in his last phase, the semiotics of passions, Greimas himself had already hinted at the ontological questions as the basis of his thought. He launched new notions of 'phorique' tensivity, and valence, the former of which was the same as Husserl's pretention of a subject; so he referred to the phenomenological aspect of his theories, not mentioned since the quoting Merleau-Ponty in his early writings. In the end what was involved was the argument: Th e being of the world and subject do not depend on semiotics but on the ontology, it is to use the jargon the manifesting of the manifested what we are searching for. (Greimas, Fontanille 1991: 15, 25-27) At this point, it is certainly appropriate to say a word about existential semiotics. Th is term probably fi rst appeared in the monograph Existential Semiotics (Tarasti 2000) , which was one of the last semiotic treatises produced in the series once established by Th omas Sebeok at Indiana University Press. It must be said as a comment that in spite of his well-known hostility towards the French School, Sebeok published many English translations of Greimas' works (like the Dictionary) at Indiana University Press. Th e new theory of existential semiotics was in fact a combination of continental philosophy in the line of Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Wahl, Marcel, etc. and classic semiotics, including Greimas. In this sense it was a synthesizing eff ort inside the European intellectual tradition, yet on the other hand, it was a rather radical eff ort of renewal, of creating a new theory or what I would later call 'neosemiotics' of the 21st century.
Th e starting points were temporality, subjectivity, logic of change, fl ux, qualitative research, experience, existentiality, values, and transcendence. Its fi rst models were indeed far afi eld from the Cartesian squares and layered structures to be found in Greimas. It adopted a new outlook by using circular models, arrows portraying the 'journeys' of the subject beyond his/her living world now called by the untranslated (or untranlatable) German word Dasein. Th us it seemed to be something opposed to the Paris School, but it was not so in the end.
Still, in this existential theory much is based upon dialectics between the present and the absent, say, the interaction between the empirical reality and transcendence. Th e easiest defi nition of transcendence was certainly "anything which is absent but present in our minds". However, the notion of transcendence launched into semiotics was neither of a theological nor of a psychological (psychedelic 'trip') or an anthropological (a shamanistic practice) origin, but conceptual and philosophical. In this sense it was rather stemming from Immanuel Kant. Yet, as could be expected, it was always an object of misunderstanding. So in the end, in the present state of the theory, I distinguish three kinds of transcendences: (1) the empirical one, transcendence a posteriori, according to our daily experience; (2) the existential one: I can stop in my action, living, experiencing and step into the transcendence; at any moment, I can say like Faust: "Verweile doch, du bist so schön"; (3) the radical one: it is the theological one present in many thinkers through ages such as Dante, Th omas Aquinas, Ibn Arabi, Avicenna up to the American transcendentalists, Emerson, etc. In any case, it is opposed to the idea that the semantic universe, the living world where we are -or into which we have been "cast" -is closed. As semiotic "animals" we can even amidst our corporeality step outside this process at any time. Anyway, the notion of transcendence with all its varieties can lead to what I called a transcultural theory of transcendence, whereby we can compare diff erent cultures and their views of transcendence. Th is is to continue the debate started by the American linguist Walburga von Raffl er-Engel about crosscultural misunderstandings, an extremely topical issue in the contemporary world of huge immigration movements and cultural confl icts, involving diverse uses of the transcendental idea. We have to remember that it is the most abstract theories that will prove to be the most infl uential ones in the end with their pragmatic applications.
Further, other elements were included in the theory of Dasein stemming from the Hegelian logics. Th e categories of an-sich-sein and für-sich-sein, being-in-oneself and being-for-oneself, were very important. Th e case was further enriched by inserting Fontanille's categories of Moi and Soi so that we ended up with a 'semiotic square': Being-in-myself = Moi1 = body as such; Being-for-myself = Moi2 = person, habit; Being-for-oneself = Soi2 = social practices; and Being-in-oneself = Soi1 = values and norms. So we reached the familiar semiotic square aft er all! (Strictly speaking it was not quite the semiotic square with its logical implications, but still something along those lines.) Yet very soon the theory went further and the square was replaced by what is called the 'Zemic' model, the letter Z symbolizing the movement within the structure either from body -by gradual sublimation -into values, or from abstract values -by stepwise embodiment -into our primal corporeal behaviour.
Th e part '-emic' evoked Kenneth Pike's theory of the emic and etic aspects or categories, 'emic' being the internal and 'etic' the external. Th e model was intended to portray nothing less than the human mind, aft er all. Th en the truly semiotic problem of course was how it manifested in signs and texts, so how it was textualized. Nevertheless, the semiotic moment was not seen as something added only later, when we need to manifest or "utter" this state of aff airs, but it was included in the movement of "semiotic" signifying forces within the model itself.
However, I do not see any contradiction between being an existential semiotician and still continuing to conduct Greimassian analyses of any kind of sign complexes or signifying phenomena: my recent treatise Sein und Schein (Tarasti 2015) contains strictly Greimassian analyses side by side with existential refl ections (e.g. an analysis of Wagner's Die Walküre, Act 2, Scene 4).
We know that many contemporary theories in human sciences use semiotics, but, alas, without mentioning the origins. One does not necessarily need to start ab ovo, but without a certain kind of erudition in the fi eld of the history of ideas, the new semiotics remains rather superfi cial and its results not lasting ones. For instance, Deleuze's thought is full of semiotics but people just quote Delezue and do not take him as a semiotician. Th e same goes for all those Parisian geniuses who once became fashionable in the American academic world, starting from Foucault and Derrida up to Barthes. Fortunately, Greimas never had to endure this fate. Even in France his thought was not "bien mediatisé", so it could develop more peacefully according to its inner logic and on a deeply refl ective level.
In British cultural theory which has become predominant in social studies and the humanities, Greimas is seldom mentioned. In fact, it could be studied how well and to which extent diverse parts of the Greimassian heritage have been received. If many can understand its popular models of actants or even isotopies, there are rather few of those who have seriously continued writing modal grammars. Yet we cannot stop the time and even scientifi c theories have their aspectualities i.e. initium, motus and terminus or inchoativity, durativity and terminativity; but as we know from music, the terminus can always be also the initium of the next phase.
